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ARTICLE
THE NATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL ACT:
A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION TO THE
NATION'S INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS
CARA H. DRINAN*
For decades, scholars and practitioners have criticized the deplorable quality of
legal representation available to poor criminal defendants across the country.
Yet states continue to give short shrift to the constitutional rights of poor defend-
ants. This Article proposes a new piece offederal legislation designed to amelio-
rate the chronic inadequacies of public defense systems, while respecting
federalism and leaving intact the states' ability to devise and implement appro-
priate public defense systems. The centerpiece of this proposed legislation is a
new federal cause of action that allows indigent defendants to seek equitable
relief for systemic Sixth Amendment violations on a prospective basis. This Arti-
cle proceeds in three parts. Part II documents the ongoing national crisis in
public defense services and makes the case for why Congress should tackle this
issue. The habeas system, currently the primary relief valve for policing Sixth
Amendment violations, simply is not set up for the task of vindicating the right to
counsel. Part Ill sets forth the text of the proposed statute and addresses the
mechanics of the statute in practice. In particular, Part III deals with the issues
of who may sue and be sued under the statute, what constitutes a cognizable
claim under the statute, and what a judicial remedy under the statute may look
like given the abstention and separation of powers concerns in play. Part IV
anticipates the reactions of two different camps: those readers who question the
practical viability of this proposal and those who advocate alternative reform
measures. This Article argues that Congress can enact this legislation pursuant
to its civil rights enforcement authority and that there are reasons to be optimis-
tic about its passage and its survival of judicial scrutiny. Finally, the Article
concludes by emphasizing that systemic challenges to public defense systems
require a federal forum. This legislation is designed to pave the way for such a
forum, and even if Congress chooses not to pursue the path described herein, the
federal government should continue to explore ways to enable such suits in fed-
eral court.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of Amer-
ica. This Article was supported by a grant from the Dean's Research Fund. The author is
grateful to the members of the law school faculty at the University of Georgia for inviting her
to present this Article as part of their Faculty Colloquium Series and for providing valuable
comments. She is equally indebted to her own colleagues at Catholic for allowing her to pre-
sent this Article as a work-in-progress and for their insightful comments. Fred Bloom, Robin
Dahlberg, Nora Freeman Engstrom, Ben Herman, Nate Persily, Eve Brensike Primus, and Bo
Rutledge provided helpful comments on preliminary versions of this Article. Beth Edinger and
Michael Frantz provided excellent research assistance. Special thanks to Jim Neuhard, Michi-
gan's Chief Appellate Defender, for first asking the author to explore congressional solutions
to the national indigent defense crisis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite voluminous empirical evidence and scholarly research describ-
ing the national crisis in indigent defense services, this seemingly intractable
crisis persists.' As The Constitution Project's 2009 Report, Justice Denied,
detailed, indigent defense systems across the nation operate with far too little
money, resulting in a host of interrelated consequences.2 Public defenders
carry excessive caseloads, they have inadequate, if any, access to investiga-
tive and expert assistance, and they cannot meet with and counsel their cli-
ents effectively and in a timely manner.' Defense counsel working under
these circumstances can barely satisfy their professional and ethical obliga-
tions, let alone provide zealous representation. 4 Clients of these defenders
'See generally Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal
Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006); STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID &
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS'N, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING
QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/de-
fender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf [hereinafter GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE]; NAT'L RIGHT
TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING
NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009), available at http://tcpjus-
ticedenied.org/index.phpoption =comcontent&view= article&id=53&Itemid=84 [hereinaf-
ter JUSTICE DENIED]; ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF.
LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA'S BROKEN MIS-
DEMEANOR COURTS (2009), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/mis-
demeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf (discussing the way in which the growth in misdemeanor crimes
exacerbates the ongoing indigent defense crisis).
2 JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 1, at 6-7.3 See infra Part H.A.
' For example, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct require: "In all professional
functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should maintain com-
munication with a client concerning the representation." MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT
pmbl. (2002); see also id. at R. 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and prepa-
ration reasonably necessary for the representation."); id. at R. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."); id. at R. 1.3 cmt. ("A lawyer
should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal incon-
venience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindi-
cate a client's cause or endeavor .... A lawyer's work load must be controlled so that each
matter can be handled competently .... Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely
resented than procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the pas-
sage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a
statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed."); id. at R. 1.4 (requiring
lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed). Moreover, criminal defense lawyers are subject
to a host of more specific standards and guidelines. See AM. BAR AssN, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloadsi
sclaid/deathpenaltyguidelines2003.pdf; AM. BAR AssN, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 117-248 (3d ed. 1993). Finally, the
American Bar Association ("ABA") has established guidelines that govern the administration
of public defense systems, and these guidelines require the active participation of the criminal
defense attorneys working within the system. See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID &
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR Ass'N, EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO
ExcESSIVE WORKLOADS (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/Iegalservices/sclaid/de-
fender/downloads/eight-guidelinesof-publicdefense.pdf (requiring defense counsel, for ex-
ample, to decline excessive appointments); STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
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suffer a host of otherwise avoidable consequences. Many indigent defend-
ants make unintelligent waivers of their right to counsel, endure months in
jail without hearing a status report from their lawyers, fail to secure pre-trial
releases from jail, and either agree to plea bargains or go to trial without
adequate discussion or preparation.' In short, the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel has yet to be realized for most indigent defendants across the
country.
The findings contained in Justice Denied are neither new nor surprising
to those who work in the field of indigent defense. Rather, the report serves
as a call to action for entities and individuals, both in government and in the
private sector, to focus on "the injustices and societal costs entailed by inad-
equate systems of indigent defense" and to explore solutions.6 This Article
offers a possible solution: a federal bill designed to pave the way for sys-
temic Sixth Amendment claims to be heard in federal court.
This Article argues that Congress can and should pass legislation rein-
forcing the constitutional right to counsel in order to break the stalemate that
has plagued indigent defense reform. The argument proceeds in three steps.
Part II of this Article articulates why federal legislation is warranted under
the present circumstances. Scholars and policymakers have extensively doc-
umented the national scope of the indigent defense crisis.7 At the same time,
no state or federal body has been able to implement lasting reform.' State
legislative and executive officials often lack either the political will or the
financial means to fix a broken defense system. State courts also may lack
the required degree of independence to overhaul the indigent defense sys-
tem,9 and historically, the federal courts have dismissed systemic Sixth
Amendment claims, citing abstention and federalism concerns. 10 Part II
urges that Congress may be the last hope for criminal defendants nationwide
who seek to vindicate their right to counsel.
Part III sets forth the language of the proposed statute and explores the
statute's mechanics in practice. The centerpiece of this legislation is a cause
of action in federal court that allows indigent defendants to seek equitable
relief for systemic Sixth Amendment violations on a prospective basis. In
some jurisdictions, the system is so broken that no defendant can hope to
DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR AssN, THE TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM
(2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/resolutionl07.pdf
[hereinafter TEN PRINCIPLES] (same).
5 See infra Part II.A.
6 JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 1, at 14.
'See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also David A. Simon, Note, Equal Before
the Law: Toward a Restoration of Gideon's Promise, 43 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 581, 581 n.4
(2008) (citing scholarship on this point); Steven N. Yermish, Ethical Issues in Indigent De-
fense: The Continuing Crisis of Excessive Caseloads, CHAMPION, June 2009, at 22.
8 See infra Part II.A.
9 Thirty-nine states elect some or all of their judges. AM. BAR ASS'N, FACT SHEET ON
JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN THE STATES, available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/
fact -sheet.pdf [hereinafter FACT SHEETI; see also infra Part II.B.
'o See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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receive competent-let alone zealous-representation. Forcing a defendant
to exhaust his Sixth Amendment claim in state court before pursuing federal
habeas relief not only applies the incorrect legal standard to a pre-trial claim,
but also, as a practical matter, virtually guarantees that a defendant in a truly
broken system will have no opportunity to vindicate his right to the effective
assistance of counsel. By the time a defendant wends his way through the
system and returns to federal court on a habeas petition, the very inefficacy
he challenged at the outset has all but sealed his legal fate. Federal legisla-
tion should correct this legal predicament by allowing defendants to seek
prospective relief when they are clients in a defense system that fails to
provide "counsel acting in the role of an advocate."'"
Further, any public defense reform statute must accomplish at least four
goals: it must (1) squarely place the burden of Gideon v. Wainwright" on the
states; (2) give meaning to the notion of ineffective assistance of counsel
without raising a separation of powers concern; (3) address who may sue
and be sued pursuant to the statute; and (4) outline appropriate remedies.
Part III makes clear how the proposed statute addresses each of these
objectives.
Part IV then addresses potential objections to the proposed statute from
two different camps: (1) those who question the practical viability of this
proposal; and (2) those who advocate alternative reform measures. This Arti-
cle maintains that Congress has the constitutional authority to enact this stat-
ute under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, that there are good
incentives for Congress to tackle this issue, and that the Supreme Court
would uphold this statute as constitutional under its civil rights enforcement
precedent. At the same time, the Article argues that this legislative proposal,
while not mutually exclusive of all others in this area, holds distinct appeal
for several reasons: (1) it does not require Congress to earmark federal funds
for indigent defense on an annual basis; (2) it provides an incentive for states
to create lasting reform, which many states have struggled to do; and (3) it
respects federalism by allowing each state the opportunity to select its own
system for the delivery of public defense services.
Finally, this Article concludes by noting that systemic challenges to
public defense systems require a federal forum. Notwithstanding the federal
courts' prudential aversion to tinkering with criminal justice at the state
level, indigent defense suits are emblematic of precisely the kinds of suits
that require federal judicial intervention-that is, suits brought by those who
do not have a meaningful voice in the political process. This legislation is
designed to pave the way for systemic public defense reform. Thus, even if
" United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984) ("The right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.... [If the process loses its character as a confron-
tation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated.").
12 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Congress chooses not to pursue the path described in this Article, the federal
government should continue to explore new ways to allow such suits to be
brought in federal court.
II. THE CASE FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
This Part demonstrates that the indigent defense crisis is national in
scope and thus requires a national solution. Section A describes the ongoing
shortcomings of public defense systems across the country. Section B then
explains why it should be Congress that addresses this issue.
A. The Ongoing National Crisis in Indigent Defense
Scholars have documented the depth and breadth of our nation's crisis
in indigent defense services.13 This Section briefly outlines the contours of
that crisis to put the legislative proposal in context.
There are many symptoms of the public defense crisis, but its primary
cause is a lack of adequate funding.' 4 Even before the country's current eco-
nomic crisis, already-strapped public defense systems were experiencing
budget cuts, which have, predictably, deepened since the beginning of the
2008 recession. 5 "Now, 37 states are facing mid-year budget shortfalls for
fiscal year 2009, and 22 of these states fully fund their indigent defense
systems."' 6
With persistent funding problems come a host of other conditions that
generate chronic and pervasive deprivations of the right to counsel. As a
result of funding shortfalls, defense lawyers must manage workloads so ex-
cessive that it is literally impossible for them to provide effective representa-
tion to all (if any) of their clients. 7 For example, the Minnesota state
legislature reduced the public defense budget for the 2009 fiscal year by four
million dollars, thereby forcing the layoff of twenty-three public defenders. 8
As a result of these layoffs, public defenders in Minnesota are now expected
to manage a caseload of an estimated 550 felony cases per year, instead of
the 450 felonies per year that each attorney managed prior to the cuts. 19
Lawyers who carry such excessive workloads are not able to meet with their
'3 See supra notes 1, 7 and accompanying text.
"See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 427,429-30 (2009); see also JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 1, at 52-64
(discussing insufficient funding of defense systems nationwide).
15 JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 1, at 59-60.
16 Id. at 59.
"7 Id. at 65-70 (discussing excessive caseloads nationwide).
18 Id. at 60.
19 Id. It is worth noting that even before this increase, these public defenders were manag-
ing a workload well outside accepted caseload limits. See, e.g., TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 4,
at 5 n. 19 (2002) (listing recommended national caseload limits, including the maximum of 150
felonies per year).
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clients on a regular basis and thus cannot establish the attorney-client rela-
tionship necessary for effective advocacy.20 Further, cash-strapped public de-
fense systems cannot adequately compensate and train their attorneys, which
often results in public defenders who lack the requisite skill, training, and
experience for the cases they handle.2"
To make matters worse, in many jurisdictions, there is a lack of inde-
pendence in the employment of contract and assigned defense counsel, re-
sulting in a system of patronage that betrays the most basic notions of client
loyalty. 22 Finally, as scholars have documented, there are serious collateral
consequences that flow from ineffective assistance of counsel, or even the
complete absence of counsel.23 In addition to a potentially erroneous sen-
tence or conviction, the wronged defendant stands to lose the right to vote,
access to public services, housing, employment opportunities, and social
connections.2 4
Today there are class action suits pending in New York25 and Michi-
gan26 challenging systemic deprivations of the right to counsel. The named
plaintiffs' allegations illustrate how America's public defense systems are
broken and under-funded. For example, in the Michigan suit, one of the
named plaintiffs alleges that he met with his attorney for "approximately
two minutes" at a preliminary examination conference and did not have an
opportunity to discuss his valid defenses, even though he was facing more
than twenty years in prison.27 Another named plaintiff in the Michigan suit
claims to have met with his public defender for the first time at a pre-exami-
nation conference. 28 After speaking for only five minutes, defense counsel
allegedly advised his client to plead guilty, even though the attorney had
done no investigation into the charge or whether his client had any de-
fenses.29 In the New York suit, one named plaintiff was charged with bring-
2 JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 1, at 95-97.
21 Id. at 91-93 (citing examples in Alabama where brand new attorneys are just as likely
to be assigned to serious felony cases as seasoned, capable attorneys, and also citing examples
in New York, where some counties have no eligibility requirements for assigned counsel
cases); see also GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 1, at 7 (describing the link between
insufficient funding, lack of training, and poor quality of defense representation).
22 JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 1, at 82 (describing one attorney in Harris County, Texas,
who received 250 juvenile court-appointed cases notwithstanding the fact that his license had
been suspended twice); see also GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 1, at 20-21 (discuss-
ing examples of a lack of independence in defense systems across the country).
23 JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 1, at 72.
24 Id.; see also Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences
of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 254 (2002) ("[Collateral sanctions
may make it impossible for convicted persons to be employed, to lead law-abiding lives, to
complete probation, or to avoid recidivism.").
25 Complaint, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2007) [herein-
after Hurrell-Harring Complaint].
26 Complaint, Duncan v. State, No. 07-000242-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Ingham County Feb.
22, 2007) [hereinafter Duncan Complaint].27 Id. at 16-17.
28 Id. at 8.
29 Id.
[Vol. 47
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ing less than one ounce of marijuana to her husband in prison.30 She was a
nurse with no prior criminal record, and yet her bail was set at ten thousand
dollars, arguably, at least in part because she was not represented at her
arraignment.3 She could not pay this amount and subsequently was incarcer-
ated for the period preceding her trial.32 After spending several weeks in jail
without hearing from her attorney, she pled guilty to a first-degree felony
charge.33 Her lawyer had several grounds under New York law upon which
he could have argued for probation, yet, according to her allegations, he
failed to investigate her case or return her phone calls from jail.34 As a result
of this felony conviction, Mrs. Hurrell-Harring lost her nursing license and
has been unemployed for months.
35
Of course, the worst-case scenario in a dysfunctional public defense
system is the conviction of an innocent defendant. For example, Alan J.
Crotzer served twenty-four years in Florida prison before DNA evidence
exonerated him of his prior conviction for rape and kidnapping. 36 By the
time he was freed from prison, Mr. Crotzer had spent nearly half of his life
behind bars for a crime he did not comnit.3 7 Recently, Mr. Crotzer was one
of several members of the National Right to Counsel Committee who testi-
fied before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and
Homeland Security.38 Mr. Crotzer stated:
As a defendant, I was in the position of having to file subpoena
requests for documents and witnesses while my appointed attorney
was literally on vacation. We have a saying for public defenders in
Florida: "public pretenders." I am living proof of the need for a
significant overhaul of the indigent defense services provided in
our nation.39
The Michigan and New York class action suits, as well as the example
of Mr. Crotzer, underscore the deplorable state of the nation's public defense
systems. Across the country, systems are under-funded, resulting in the ac-
tual or constructive absence of legal representation at critical stages of the







31 Deborah Hastings, Nationwide, Public Defender Offices Are in Crisis, ASSOCIATED
PRESs, June 3, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com[US/wireStory?id=7749486.
36 See Press Release, The Constitution Project, National Right to Counsel Committee
Members Testify on Indigent Defense Crisis and Issue Urgent Call for Reforms (June 4, 2009),




38 Indigent Representation: A Growing National Crisis: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 1 th Cong.
15-16 (2009) (statement of Alan J. Crotzer, Probation and Community Intervention Officer,
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice).
" Members Testify, supra note 36.
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adversarial process. 40 As a result, defendants are deprived of their Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, and defense lawyers often find it difficult to
perform their jobs consistent with the professional ethics guidelines.4' Indi-
viduals may be wrongfully convicted or receive an excessive sentence be-
cause of ineffective representation, while at the same time, taxpayers are
footing the bill for these systemic inefficiencies.
B. Why Federal Legislation?
There are two primary reasons why Congress should tackle the issue of
inadequate indigent defense. First, the crisis is national in scope and thus
requires a national solution.42 Congress has the ability to conduct fact-find-
ing and to gather data on a national scale-a unique power that has made it
the appropriate forum for many social reforms.4 3 Second, and related, other
branches of government at both the state and federal level have been unable
to generate meaningful reform in this arena. Given that there is a constitu-
tional right at stake, Congress must act.
Though indigent defense advocates have historically sought relief from
state legislators and from both state and federal benches, none of these insti-
tutions has been a vehicle for substantive and lasting reform. To begin, seek-
ing indigent defense reform from a state legislative body poses a
fundamental political process problem.44 There are countless demands upon
a state treasury, and in the current economic crisis, state fiscal resources are
more constrained than ever. As a result, legislators must weigh carefully the
competing demands upon those limited funds.45 Indigent defendants simply
do not have a voice in the debate over how to allocate state resources. As
I See supra notes 1, 7 and accompanying text.
41 See supra note 4.
42 See Norman L. Reimer, A Call to Action in Support of the Right to Counsel: Federal
Right-Federal Responsibility, CHAMPION, June 2009, at 7 (urging Congress to address right-
to-counsel issue in a number of ways, including steps to "ensure that clients can vindicate their
right to counsel in the federal courts").
" See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Pre-
liminary Analysis, 50 DuKE L.J. 1169, 1178-79 (2001) (describing the traditional view that
"[1]egislatures, as compared to courts, 'have substantial staff, funds, time and procedures to
devote to effective information gathering and sorting"' (citation omitted)).
" Deborah L. Rhode, Gideon's Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 955, 962 (2004) ("Perhaps
we are dealing with a classic example of a right enjoyed by a 'discrete and insular minorit[y],'
which the political process itself cannot be entrusted to protect. Despite our rhetorical commit-
ment to the presumption of innocence, the class of whom we are speaking here-indigent
people charged with criminal offenses-is as powerless a class as one could imagine."); cf
Developments in the Law-The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REv. 1114, 1166 (2008)
("Mentally ill defendants cannot rely on local democracy to enforce the proper moral outcome
or to protect them. For there is a political process problem: mentally ill defendants systemati-
cally lack access to local legislatures that could advocate for their interests. And given that
most state judges are elected, they too are too vulnerable to majoritarian pressures to protect
the insular rights at issue.").
" See Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 9, 2008, at Al (discussing budget cuts and their impact on public defense services).
[Vol. 47
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one public defender described the challenge for legislators considering pub-
lic defense reform, "there ain't a damn vote in it."46 Thus, without an exter-
nal-usually litigation-related-impetus, state legislators lack both the
political will and the financial resources to meaningfully reform indigent
defense services on a statewide basis.
Similarly, state courts can be a problematic venue for systemic reform
of public defense systems. Thirty-nine states elect some or all of their
judges, 47 and "[b]etween 2000 and 2007, state Supreme Court contests
raised 168 million dollars, more than twice the amount raised in the
1990s." '48 Elected judges are subject to the same majoritarian pressures as
elected lawmakers, including the pressure to be tough on crime. 49 Moreover,
in many of the worst-off jurisdictions, state court judges are overseeing defi-
cient public defense systems and thus may not be inclined to reform the
status quo.50 Thus, state court judges as a group may not be inclined to take
up the cause of public defense reform.
The federal courts traditionally have been hostile to systemic Sixth
Amendment challenges, especially on a pre-trial basis. These courts have
avoided addressing the merits of these claims, citing abstention and federal-
ism." Although federal judges ought to hear these cases despite those doc-
trines, 2 plaintiffs' counsel in these types of suits are understandably reluctant
to take their chances in federal court. Not only are these systemic lawsuits
expensive and time-consuming, 3 but also, the last thing impact attorneys
want to do is create precedent that further precludes a federal forum for these
suits.
46 Telephone Interview with Jim Neuhard, Dir., Mich. State Appellate Defender Office
(May 27, 2009).47 FACT SHEET, supra note 9.
48 Not for Sale, Limiting Money in America's Courts, ECONOMIST, June 11, 2009, available
at http://www.economist.cornworld/unitedstates/displaystory.cfm?story-
id= 13832427.
49 Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State Judiciary Violate
Criminal Defendants' Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1101, 1103-09 (2006); see also
Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (holding that elected judge should have
recused himself in case where defendant had donated three million dollars to judge's
campaign).
50 See, e.g., Julie Shaw, Court-Appointed Defense Lawyers Sue for Better Pay, PrmA.
DAILY NEws, Apr. 10, 2008, available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/l207945197.
6/20080410_- Court-appointed-defenselawyers-suefor betterpay.html (describing a lawsuit
brought by court-appointed lawyers challenging the court-run public defense system that has
not raised attorney compensation rates since 1993).
51 See, e.g., Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 676-79 (11 th Cir. 1992) (holding that absten-
tion in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), barred the federal court from mandating an
overhauled public defense system in Georgia); see also, Foster v. Kassulke, 898 F.2d 1144 (6th
Cir. 1990) (rejecting an inmate's challenge to Kentucky public defense system on abstention
grounds); Wallace v. Kern, 499 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1974) (rejecting right to speedy trial of
class action by inmates on federalism grounds); Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.
1974) (rejecting a class action challenging the Florida public defense system on abstention
grounds).
12 Drinan, supra note 14, at 468-70.
13 Telephone Interview with Robin Dahlberg, Senior Staff Attorney, A.C.L.U. (June 23,
2008).
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In a prior work, this author expressed optimism about the trajectory of
systemic public defense litigation, the bulk of which has occurred in state
court. Some individual judges at the state level have attempted to generate
reform,55 and more recently, state court litigation has generated systemic re-
form of public defense services.56 While this author coitinues to think that
there is a place for this type of litigation, it remains to be seen whether the
reform generated by these suits can be sustained in the years to come. For
example, when this author's last piece went to press the systemic suits pend-
ing in New York and Michigan had survived motions to dismiss.17 Today,
both state supreme courts are poised to rule on the question whether a state
court may overhaul a public defense system, or whether such a task is a
legislative function. 8 In any event, the type of federal legislation proposed
herein is not incompatible with these class action suits in state court. Moreo-
ver, the proposed legislation may serve as a check on the temptation for
states to renege on litigation settlements or reform agreements.
In sum, judicial and legislative officials at the state level have little
incentive to reform indigent defense and may face electoral risks when they
do so. Currently, state and federal courts offer at best expensive, unpredict-
able, and perhaps unsustainable relief. Thus, the federal government needs to
step in to resuscitate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. If Congress
were to enact a piece of legislation like the one proposed herein, it would
follow in the footsteps of brave congressional actions of the past, such as the
passage of the Civil Rights Act,59 the Voting Rights Act,60 the Americans
with Disabilities Act61 and the Family and Medical Leave Act.6
" See generally Drinan, supra note 14.
55 See, e.g., State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993) (announcing a rebuttable presump-
tion that indigent defendants in New Orleans were receiving ineffective assistance of counsel);
State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990) (setting guidelines for public defense counsel
compensation in the absence of legislative action); State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984)
(declaring the Mohave County bid system for selection of defense counsel to be in violation of
several professional standards).
56 See Drinan, supra note 14, at 443-62 (discussing "Second-Generation" systemic Sixth
Amendment suits that have gained traction in state courts).
" Joel Stashenko, Suit Proceeds over Providing Criminal Defense to Poor, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 12, 2008, at 1; Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming a trial
court denial of the state's motion to dismiss).
58 See Duncan v. State, 775 N.W.2d 745 (Mich. 2009) (granting defendant leave to appeal
the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals); Hurrell-Harring v. State, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349,
351 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) ("In our view, any decisions to address [systemic] 'deficiencies'
should be made by the executive and legislative branches of government, and not by the Judi-
ciary."); Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Hurrell-Harring, No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Sept. 28, 2009)
(appealing the decision to the state's highest court) (on file with author).
5942 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
6042 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973gg-9 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
61 Id. §§ 12101-213 (2006).
62 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2006 & Supp. U 2008).
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III. THE PROPOSED NATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL ACT
Having described the ongoing crisis in indigent defense and having ar-
gued that Congress needs to tackle this issue, this Part describes what a
congressional solution should look like. Specifically, Section A sets forth a
legislative proposal-the National Right to Counsel Act ("NRTCA"). Sec-
tion B addresses the central elements that any public defense reform statute
should include and makes explicit the ways in which the text of the NRTCA
advances these goals.
A. The Statutory Text: The National Right to Counsel Act
As described infra, in Part IV.A, Congress has the authority to enact
national public defense reform legislation. The proposed text of this legisla-
tion is as follows:
An Act to enforce the constitutional right to the assistance of ef-
fective counsel at all stages of the adversarial process, to confer
jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States to provide
declaratory and injunctive relief against systemic violations of this
right, and for other purposes.
Section 1.
(a) All indigent persons facing criminal charges in state court shall
be entitled to the effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,
63 at the state's expense.64
(b) The assistance of counsel is considered ineffective when a per-
son can demonstrate one of the following:
(1) the actual denial of appointed counsel after the state's
commencement of adversarial proceedings, 65 or
(2) the constructive denial of counsel after the state's com-
mencement of adversarial proceedings,6 6 which shall include, but
not be limited to, the following:
63 While the statutory language sets forth some, but not all, of the factual scenarios that
may constitute a cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the statute does not
attempt to redefine or add to those rights embodied in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
as articulated by the Supreme Court. In fact, as described in Part III, infra, the statute specifi-
cally tracks the Supreme Court's precedent on right-to-counsel claims so as to avoid a separa-
tion of powers problem.
6 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
65 See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008) (confirming that the right to
counsel attaches as soon as defendant learns of the charges against him and his liberty is
subject to restriction).
66 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) ("In certain Sixth Amendment
contexts, prejudice is presumed. Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel
altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice.").
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(A) representation by a lawyer who is operating under an
actual conflict of interest;
67
(B) representation by a lawyer whose workload is so ex-
cessive that effective representation is not possible; 6s or
(C) representation by a lawyer who lacks the requisite
training, ability, and experience.
69
(c) Where the state delegates fiscal and/or administrative authority
over the public defense function to one of its political subdivi-
sions, the state retains ultimate responsibility for securing the con-
stitutional right to counsel.
70
Section 2.
(a) Whenever a state or one of its political subdivisions fails on a
systemic basis to guarantee the right to the assistance of effective
counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,
aggrieved persons may commence a civil class action in the dis-
trict courts of the United States to seek declaratory, injunctive, and
other equitable relief as the court sees fit.
(b) A state shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States from an action in federal or
state court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this statute.
7'
(c) A federal court entertaining a petition for relief filed under this
statute shall not be subject to the abstention restrictions articulated
in Younger v. Harris.72
(d) Where an action pursuant to this statute is filed on a pre-trial
basis, members of the class shall have the burden of establishing
that the constitutional right to counsel is being violated on an
67 See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (holding that "[iln order to demon-
strate a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, a defendant must establish that an actual
conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance").
6 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) ("[I]f counsel entirely fails to
subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of
Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.");
see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (holding that the defendants were "not
accorded the right to counsel in any substantive sense" because of the state supreme court's
findings that defendants' counsel's appearance was "pro forma" rather than "zealous and
active").
9 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) ("[Diefendants facing felony
charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel. . . . [I]f the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the
mercies of incompetent counsel, and ... judges should strive to maintain proper standards of
performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts."
(footnote omitted)).
7 See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (imposing upon states the
obligation to provide representation to poor defendants).
" It is possible to leave this provision out and simply address the Eleventh Amendment
issue by requiring litigants to sue the relevant state official under Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908). However, the statute would be a better tool for plaintiffs if it bypassed this issue
altogether by expressly abrogating the states' sovereign immunity. See infra Part III.B.
72 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see also infra Part uI.B.
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ongoing basis and that there is a likelihood of imminent and irrep-
arable injury from that violation.
73
(e) In any action or proceeding brought under section (2), the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than a
state or a named state official, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs. In awarding an attorney's fee under this section, the
court, in its discretion, may include expert fees as part of the attor-
ney's fee.
(f) Nothing in this section shall restrict any rights that any person
may have under any other statute or under common law to seek
redress for a violation of the right to counsel.
B. The Statute in Practice
Any legislation designed to generate nationwide public defense reform
needs to incorporate several critical elements. First, the statute must confirm
that the burden of providing indigent defendants with counsel rests with the
states. Second, the statute needs to give some weight to the notion of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel without running afoul of Supreme Court prece-
dent, thereby raising a separation of powers concern. Third, the statute must
address who will be appropriate parties to a suit brought under the statute.
Finally, the statute needs to address the question of appropriate remedies.
This Section discusses how the statute as drafted in Part III.A addresses each
of these goals.
1. States Must Comply with the Sixth Amendment
First, any reform statute needs to confirm that the obligation to provide
indigent defendants with representation lies with the state. In 1963, the Su-
preme Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright that when a criminal defendant
cannot afford an attorney, the state must provide him with counsel. 74 Yet, in
sixteen states, more than half of public defense costs are paid for by the
county; and in two states, Pennsylvania and Utah, there is no state funding at
all.75 These states abdicate their constitutional obligations under Gideon
" See Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11 th Cir. 1988); see also Nicholson v.
Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Ordinarily, claims of ineffective repre-
sentation are dealt with on an individualized basis after the fact, because a person must show
deficient performance by counsel and actual prejudice arising from that deficiency .... But
where the state imposes systemic barriers to effective representation, prospective injunctive
relief without individualized proof of injury is necessary and appropriate." (citations omitted)).
"4 372 U.S. 335; see also Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal De-
fendants Pay for Their Court-Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution, 42
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 328 (2009) (discussing the state's obligation to provide counsel).
" JusTIcE DENIED, supra note 1, at 54.
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when they require counties to fund indigent defense services.76 Any reform
statute must confirm that fiscal responsibility lies with the state, even where
public defense services are delivered at the county level. The NRTCA ad-
dresses this goal in sections 1(a) and (c) by confirming that the states are
required to fund indigent defense.77 Additionally, it states that even where
political sub-divisions are involved in the delivery of public defense ser-
vices, the state is ultimately responsible for the availability and quality of
such services.7 1
2. The Meaning of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Second, any reform statute must give weight to the notion of ineffective
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington,79 the Supreme Court held
that criminal defendants who claim ineffective assistance of counsel must
demonstrate both that their attorney's performance "fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness '"8 and that "there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different."8' As scholars have documented extensively, the
Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel has failed to protect
the right to the effective assistance of counsel.82 Moreover, as described in-
fra in further detail, the standard is simply inapposite for criminal defendants
seeking prospective relief.
Nonetheless, the Strickland decision is critical because it is at the ana-
lytical core of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the right to the
effective assistance of counsel.83 To the extent that Congress drafts statutory
language in an area where the Supreme Court has already delineated the
scope of a constitutional right, as would be the case here, Congress needs to
legislate carefully. Specifically, under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress may enact legislation that "deters or remedies consti-
tutional violations," but it may not implement a "substantive change in the
76 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342 (describing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as "made
obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment" (emphasis added)); Hurrell-Harring
Complaint, supra note 25, at 4.
77 See supra notes 63, 64, and accompanying text.
" See id.
79 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
'Old. at 688.8
1 Id. at 694.
' See, e.g., John H. Blume & Stacey Neumann, It's Like Dgjii Vu All Over Again: Wil-
liams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines
Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRtM. L. 127 (2007); Stephen B.
Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst
Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1857-66 (1994) (criticizing the Strickland standard); Meredith J.
Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System in Need of Reform,
2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 19 (describing why the Strickland test is so difficult for a defendant to
meet, even when the defendant is actually innocent).
83 See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374
(2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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governing law."' If it were to redefine or enlarge the scope of the Sixth
Amendment, Congress would violate the separation of powers doctrine by
usurping the Supreme Court's power as the final interpreter of the
Constitution.
85
The NRTCA as drafted in Part III seeks to avoid this separation of pow-
ers problem by defining ineffective assistance of counsel in a way that tracks
the Supreme Court's precedent. In section l(b), the statute defines ineffective
assistance of counsel as the absence of counsel-both actual and construc-
tive-after the initiation of adversarial proceedings.86 The first claim-that
the actual absence of counsel violates the Sixth Amendment-is entirely
uncontroversial; in fact, the Supreme Court confirmed this principle last
term. 7
The Supreme Court has also held that the constructive absence of coun-
sel at trial violates the Constitution. For example, in Avery v. Alabama, the
Court clarified that the constitutional right to counsel required active assis-
tance, rather than mere appointment. 88 The Avery Court explained: "[T]he
denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to consult with the
accused and to prepare his defense, could convert the appointment of coun-
sel into a sham and nothing more than a formal compliance with the Consti-
tution's requirement that an accused be given the assistance of counsel."8 9
However, the Supreme Court has been less explicit with respect to pre-
cisely what circumstances constitute constructive absence of counsel. Sec-
tion l(b)(2) sets forth three circumstances that may constitute constructive
absence of counsel under the statute. The first scenario-where the criminal
defense attorney is operating under an actual conflict of interest-is based
upon well-established Supreme Court precedent. 90 The two additional cir-
cumstances-where defense counsel's workload is so excessive that effec-
tive representation is not possible and where the lawyer lacks the requisite
training, ability, and expertise-draw upon a broader and more robust line of
Supreme Court cases. That is, the Court has recognized that there are some
scenarios where structural factors make a fair trial impossible. In United
4City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
85Id. ("Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to
be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the
right is. It has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no longer be,
in any meaningful sense, the 'provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].' (alteration in
original)).
86 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
8 Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2008); see also Michigan v. Jack-
son, 475 U.S. 625, 629 n.3 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977).
a308 U.S. 444 (1940).
89 Id. at 446.
9 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) ("Representation of a criminal
defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and hence
counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest."); Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980).
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States v. Cronic, the Court explained: "[O]n some occasions when although
counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any
lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so
small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the
actual conduct of the trial."91 Further, the Cronic Court declared that "if
counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adver-
sarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that
makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable."92 Congress
may reasonably argue that when an attorney's workload exceeds all recog-
nized standards93 and when criminal defense attorneys are appointed on the
basis of their expedience rather than their skill or experience, this line of
cases controls. In sum, even though federal legislation regarding the Sixth
Amendment must be drafted delicately so as to avoid a separation of powers
violation, the NRTCA meets that requirement in its delineation of what con-
stitutes actionable ineffective assistance of counsel.
3. Appropriate Plaintiffs and Defendants
Third, any public defense reform statute, the centerpiece of which is a
proposed cause of action in federal court, needs to address the question of
who may sue and be sued under the statute. The history of systemic public
defense litigation demonstrates that it is important for the state to be a named
defendant. 94 This is true both because there is symbolic importance in hold-
ing the state accountable for its own constitutional failings and because, if
the state itself is a named defendant, reform implementation may follow
more smoothly. Of course, a suit could (and likely would) name other de-
fendants, such as relevant state executive officials and perhaps state judges,95
but naming the state qua state as a defendant is nonetheless still critical.
Toward this end, section 2(b) of the NRTCA expressly abrogates the
states' sovereign immunity, thereby allowing states to be sued in federal
court. Critics may argue that the NRTCA offends federalism by subjecting
the states to suit in federal court without their consent, thereby violating the
91 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984).
92 Id. at 659; see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (" 'The record indicates
that the appearance was rather pro forma than zealous and active . . .' Under the circum-
stances disclosed, we hold that defendants were not accorded the fight of counsel in any sub-
stantial sense. To decide otherwise, would simply be to ignore actualities.").
" Generally accepted guidelines for annual workload limits provide that no lawyer should
handle on an annual basis more than 150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile cases, 200
mental health cases, or 25 appeals. TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 5 n.19.
" See Drinan, supra note 14, at 458-59 (describing the evolving trend to target states
rather than counties in these kinds of suits). This is also illustrated by the suits pending today
in Michigan and New York, as described in Part I.A, supra, both of which name the state as a
defendant.
9 See, e.g., Amended Complaint, White v. Martz, No. C DV-2002-133 (D. Mont. Apr. 1,
2002) (naming as defendants Governor Martz, the state Supreme Court Administrator, a dis-
trict court judge in one of the named defendant counties, and several other officials).
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Eleventh Amendment.9 6 This argument fails for two reasons. First, the Elev-
enth Amendment's bar against suing the states in federal court is not without
exception. Already, under Ex parte Young, litigants can circumvent this bar
by naming relevant state officials as defendants. 97 Second, Congress may
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when it does so expressly and pursuant to
a valid exercise of its civil rights enforcement authority.98 The proposed lan-
guage of the NRTCA makes clear the congressional intent to allow the states
to be sued in federal court. And, as discussed in Part IV.A, infra, because
this Article proposes legislation pursuant to Congress's civil rights enforce-
ment authority, this express abrogation is permissible.99
From the plaintiffs' perspective, there are two questions that must be
addressed: (1) at what point do plaintiffs have a cause of action, and (2) who
may bring suits. Historically, federal courts dismissed systemic challenges to
defense systems by requiring criminal defendants to exhaust their claim in
state court before turning to the federal forum. 3 As a practical matter, this
meant that defendants could only challenge the efficacy of their representa-
tion under Strickland in a post-conviction proceeding.101 Some state courts
have come to the same conclusion under similar circumstances. 02
These cases err in at least two respects. First, the Strickland test is sim-
ply inapposite when a defendant (or a class of defendants) is seeking pro-
spective relief to guard against an irreparable injury. By definition, the
Strickland test is backward-looking and cannot provide prospective relief.03
Second, when courts dismiss these claims on Strickland grounds, they virtu-
ally guarantee that a defendant can never vindicate the merits of his claim
because by the time his case makes it back to federal court, the very ineffi-
cacy he challenged has sealed his fate. °4 The legislative proposal discussed
herein makes explicit that criminal defendants bringing suit under the
NRTCA do not need to demonstrate that the ineffective assistance of counsel
96
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
97 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
98 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 (2004).
'9 See infra Part IV.A.
"o See Drinan, supra note 14, at 440-42, 467-75.
101 Id.
W2 See, e.g., Hurrell-Harring v. State, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351-52 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)
(emphasizing the individual nature of ineffective assistance of counsel claims and rejecting a
suit seeking systemic relief); see also Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996)
(rejecting a systemic Sixth Amendment suit in Minnesota for failure to show individual harm).
103 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Blume & Neumann, supra note 82
and accompanying text.
04 See Laurence A. Benner, The Presumption of Guilt: Systemic Factors That Contribute
to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in California, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 322-23 (2009)
("As Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Strickland, this standard is un-
workable because evidence that may establish the defendant's innocence 'may be missing from
the record precisely because of the incompetence of defense counsel.' Documenting ineffective
assistance therefore often requires the development of additional evidence at a post-conviction
hearing. As a recent study of federal habeas petitions by Professors Nancy J. King and Joseph
L. Hoffman points out, however, relief at this stage is largely hypothetical." (citation
omitted)).
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had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of their case, as courts traditionally
require when considering an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.' °0 In-
stead, under the NRTCA, a class of plaintiffs seeking prospective relief
needs to show that its right to counsel is being violated on an ongoing basis
and that there is a likelihood of imminent and irreparable injury from that
violation. 106
Additionally, there is still the question of who may bring suit. That
concern may very well be the primary criticism leveled by opponents of the
proposed legislation. That is, if every criminal defendant with a case pending
in state court were able to bring a pretrial claim in federal court alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking prospective relief, this statute
would authorize a flood of litigation that could bring state criminal justice
systems to a grinding halt and overwhelm the already-burdened federal
courts. However, the statute is carefully drafted to avoid both negative out-
comes. Several sections of the statute-the prelude, which references "sys-
temic violation," section 2(a), which explicitly refers to a "civil class
action," and section 2(d), which refers to class "members"-make clear that
this statute does not create an individual cause of action. The statute allows
criminal defendants to aggregate their claims in a class action, thereby
preventing the flood of individual suits that some critics might predict.
The statute's class action element also makes sense for several addi-
tional reasons. First, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to support an
individual's attempt to collaterally attack a state criminal conviction with a
§ 1983 suit in federal court. 107 While these earlier cases are factually distin-
guishable from the cause of action embodied in the NRTCA in that they
dealt with suits seeking money damages and/or release from prison, they are
nonetheless optically problematic for an individual cause of action. Second,
the most recent systemic public defense suits have demonstrated that a class
action suit offers several practical benefits. For example, by definition, a
class of plaintiffs can provide more robust proof of harm than can an indi-
vidual.10 Also, a class action is procedurally desirable because as the cases
05 See supra Part III.A.
' There is precedent for courts applying this standard to systemic public defense suits.
See, e.g., Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11 th Cir. 1988); Nicholson v. Williams, 203
F. Supp. 2d 153, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89 (Mich. Ct. App.
2009). One may ask whether this standard is any easier for the criminal defendant to prove.
Even if, in fact, this revised standard is itself challenging for a defendant, it at least recognizes
that the appropriate time to review a request for prospective relief is before the alleged harm
has been inflicted.
'07 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (rejecting petitioner's civil claim for
money damages before termination of criminal proceeding); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475 (1973) (rejecting civil suit seeking immediate or speedier release and citing federal habeas
relief as the appropriate avenue).
10s Cf. Parham v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding that plaintiff
failed to establish employment discrimination on the basis of race, but that statistical evidence
of the suit overall did establish employer discrimination against blacks as a class).
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of the named plaintiffs are resolved in a state criminal proceeding, the class
still represents justiciable claims.' °9
4. Remedies
The final issue that any public defense reform statute must address is
the question of appropriate remedies. As a preliminary matter, it is important
to note that the abstention doctrine has been an impediment to previous sys-
temic Sixth Amendment civil rights actions." 0 Traditionally, the federal
courts have refused to rule on the merits of public defense civil rights suits,
arguing that to do so would constitute an unseemly interference with ongo-
ing state criminal proceedings."' Accordingly, section 2(c) of the proposed
statute expressly allows federal courts to provide a prospective remedy by
declaring Younger abstention inapplicable in these types of suits.
Although this provision of the statute may provoke criticism by states'
rights advocates,"' it is nonetheless defensible. Critics will contend that the
NRTCA unlawfully declares Younger abstention inapplicable to a whole
class of suits, and that even if Congress is acting within the bounds of the
Constitution, the provision is an ill-advised measure because it threatens to
bring all state prosecutions to a grinding halt. Each objection is surmount-
able. With respect to the question of whether Congress can declare Younger
abstention inapplicable to this class of suits in federal court, case law and
scholarship on this issue indicate that Congress has such authority. "Federal
courts do not abstain on Younger grounds because they lack jurisdiction;
rather, Younger abstention 'reflects a court's prudential decision not to exer-
cise [equity] jurisdiction which it in fact possesses."' " Moreover, scholars
"° If, for example, a named plaintiff accepts a plea agreement and thus is no longer a
suitable representative of the class of similarly situated indigent defendants, a court could
allow another class member to replace the now-absent named plaintiff. See, e.g., Phillips v.
Ford Motor Co., 435 F.3d 785, 787 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Substitution of unnamed class members
for named plaintiffs who fall out of the case because of settlement or other reasons is a com-
mon and normally an unexceptionable ('routine') feature of class action litigation."). The case
is somewhat more complex if the case has yet to be certified as a class action when the named
plaintiff drops out for one reason or another; at that point, the named plaintiff technically is the
only party with a claim before the court. However, courts do not always take such a technical
approach. See, e.g., id. ("Unless jurisdiction never attached ... or the attempt to substitute
comes long after the claims of the named plaintiffs were dismissed ... substitution for the
named plaintiffs is allowed," (citations omitted)).
110 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
... Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 678-79; see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
43-45 (1971) (explaining the federalism principles underlying the federal courts' abstention
from cases that involve ongoing state criminal proceedings).
112 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44 ("This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from
interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the
notion of 'comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.").
"' Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 614-15 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Benavidez v. Eu, 34
F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1994)); Kaufman v. Kaye, 466 F.3d 83, 88 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006); E.
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have recognized the prudential, rather than constitutional, nature of the ab-
stention doctrine and have argued that when applying the prudential absten-
tion doctrine, "courts should be careful to maintain access for those who
cannot expect a fair hearing from the political branches."' 14 Criminal de-
fendants are precisely the kind of group "who cannot expect a fair hearing
from the political branches."' 15 Thus, because of its prudential nature, Con-
gress can declare the Younger abstention doctrine inapposite in a class of
suits without raising a separation of powers concern."
6
A related concern may be that even if Congress has the constitutional
authority to declare Younger abstention inapplicable in suits brought under
the NRTCA, practically speaking this provision could bring all ongoing state
prosecutions to a halt-a detrimental outcome for all parties. But this conse-
quence need not follow. It is possible for a federal district court judge to hear
a civil claim under the NRTCA without staying state criminal proceedings.
The public defense class action pending in Michigan today provides an
example of how this could work."7 Two components are vital. First, the suit
needs to be brought as a class action so that even as the cases of the named
plaintiffs are resolved in a state criminal proceeding, the class still represents
justiciable claims."' Second, the federal district court needs to recognize that
the class itself will be "fluid" because the state criminal proceedings are
ongoing." 9 In some ways, this is akin to a court applying the "capable of
repetition yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine. 20 That is,
any class representing a group of criminal defendants will be constantly
evolving; cases will be resolved and new cases will emerge. The composi-
tion of the class is in constant flux, and if the court refused to tolerate the
fluidity of the class, there would never be an opportunity for the court to
reach the merits of the case. These are not insignificant procedural consider-
ations; but, the Michigan example demonstrates that a court can entertain a
civil complaint that implicates state criminal proceedings without entirely
stalling those proceedings. 2'
Once one recognizes that the statute dispenses with the threshold issue
of abstention, and that the federal courts can reach the merits of these suits,
Martin Estrada, Pushing Doctrinal Limits: The Trend Toward Applying Younger Abstention to
Claims for Monetary Damages and Raising Younger Abstention Sua Sponte on Appeal, 81
N.D. L. REv. 475, 476 (2005) (describing Younger abstention as "discretionary").
114 Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 512 (2008).
'"Id.
116 But see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (Miranda warnings held con-
stitutional in nature such that Congress was not free to legislatively overrule their application).
'7Duncan v. Michigan, 774 N.W.2d 89 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
11 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
"9 See, e.g., Duncan, 774 N.W.2d 89, 141.
'2 See Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2770 (2008) ("That 'exception
applies where (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to
cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining
party will be subject to the same action again."' (citations omitted)).
'21 See generally Duncan, 774 N.W.2d 89.
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the next question is what remedies are appropriate under the statute. Section
2(a) grants federal judges wide latitude in crafting appropriate remedies. On
one end of the spectrum, the district court judge could issue a declaratory
judgment confirming the state's obligations under the Sixth Amendment to
provide adequate representation and notifying the state that it has not met
those obligations. This remedy is not very contentious, but it is equally un-
helpful to defendants in a broken system. Specifically, a declaratory judg-
ment standing alone is not likely to create an adequate incentive for reform.
On the other end of the spectrum, a district court judge may issue a
broad injunction requiring prompt reform from the state or ordering the re-
lease of defendants and dismissal of charges if the state fails to appoint
counsel for qualifying indigent defendants or if counsel fail to meet with
their clients within a certain period of time. Such a decision would certainly
be more contentious, but it would also be much more likely to incentivize
prompt and meaningful change. 22 Given that such a decision immediately
raises federalism concerns, and given the historical failure of the federal
bench to reach the merits of these suits, this kind of remedy is unlikely under
the NRTCA.
However, under the NRTCA, there is an attractive middle ground op-
tion for a federal judge navigating federalism and separation of powers con-
cerns that are implicated when a state's criminal justice system is at the heart
of civil litigation. For example, the district court judge could hold eviden-
tiary hearings and, if appropriate, declare the state action (or inaction) to be
in violation of the Sixth Amendment. At that point, the judge could order the
state to develop a remedial plan within a specified time frame. It would then
be incumbent upon state legislators and executive officials to make the hard
choices related to improving a public defense system. A state could choose
to increase the number of public defenders and the resources available to
them (admittedly at the cost of reducing other public outlays or increasing
taxes), or it could reduce the number of defendants who require representa-
tion.23 The district court judge would retain jurisdiction over the suit while
the state worked to reform its public defense system. Presumably only if and
122 Cf Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. 2004)
(limiting the time during which indigent defendants could be held without appointment and
appearance of counsel before the defendants' release).
123 For example, in some states, the misdemeanor of speeding may carry a potential jail
sentence. See, e.g., Johnston v. City of Pine Bluff, 525 S.W.2d 76 (Ark. 1975) (dealing with
such an ordinance in Arkansas). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to misde-
meanor defendants who face a possible jail sentence. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33
(1972). Thus, states could reduce the number of defendants who require representation under
the Constitution by eliminating possible jail sentences for some misdemeanor offenses. Moreo-
ver, states which retain the death penalty could also generate significant defense savings by
replacing the death penalty with life-without-parole. See Cara H. Drinan, 'Backlog' Death-
Penalty Rationale Fatally Flawed, ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., May 16, 2008. For example, a recent
study demonstrated that North Carolina could save eleven million dollars annually if it abol-
ished the death penalty. Philip J. Cook, Potential Savings from Abolition of the Death Penalty
in North Carolina, 11 Am. L. & ECON. Rav. 498, 498 (2009).
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when the state failed to cooperate would the district court judge need to
order a more drastic remedy, such as the dismissal of charges for defendants
who have not been assigned counsel within a designated period of time.
12 4
In sum, the NRTCA achieves several important goals. The statute con-
firms that the burden of Gideon is on the states; it gives meaning to the
notion of ineffective assistance of counsel; it addresses appropriate parties to
a suit brought under the statute; and it addresses remedies for plaintiffs
bringing claims.
The next Part focuses on addressing the most likely questions from
skeptical readers.
IV. ADDRESSING POTENTIAL SKEPTICS
This Part aims to address two different sets of readers: those who ques-
tion the practical viability of this proposal and those who would advocate
alternative reform measures. Section A addresses the question of whether
this proposal is workable, and demonstrates that: (1) Congress has the au-
thority to pass this legislation; (2) Congress has good reason to pass this
legislation; and (3) the current Supreme Court should uphold the statute as
constitutional. Section B addresses the question of whether altemative re-
form suggestions are preferable, and argues that this proposal holds unique
appeal, but that it need not be viewed as mutually exclusive of other promis-
ing proposals.
A. Practical Viability Issues
1. Congressional Authority to Enact the NRTCA
Even one who appreciates the appeal of congressional reform in the
abstract may read this proposed legislation and question whether Congress
has the constitutional authority to enact such a measure. Congress does have
such authority under its civil rights enforcement authority-Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment.125
Theoretically, Congress could enact legislation directed at public de-
fense reform pursuant to a number of constitutional grants of authority. Con-
gress could legislate pursuant to its Article I powers, namely, the Spending
and Commerce Clauses, or Congress could act under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, the textual basis upon which Congress
24 Cf. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. Civ. S-90-0520, 2009 WL 330960 (E.D. Cal.
Aug. 4, 2009). In Coleman, a three-judge panel ordered the reduction of California's prison
population, but only after decades of the state's being on notice of its ongoing Eighth Amend-
ment violations related to prison overcrowding and only after the state's chronic failure to meet
narrow remedial orders and timeline objectives. Id.
12 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
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acts necessarily defines, at least to some extent, the contours of permissible
legislation. Thus, it is most prudent for Congress to act pursuant to its au-
thority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Constitution permits Congress to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States."' 26 Pursuant to this tax and spend-
ing power, Congress may make fiscal grants to the states and condition the
receipt of those grants on compliance with federally-set regulations.'27 How-
ever, there are limits on the ways in which Congress can exercise its spend-
ing power. For example, when acting pursuant to its spending power,
Congress must be acting in pursuit of the nation's general welfare. 28 Moreo-
ver, the Supreme Court has held that when Congress attaches conditions to
the receipt of federal funds it "must do so unambiguously .... enabl[ing]
the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences
of their participation."' 29 The Court has also explained that "conditions on
federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the federal inter-
est in particular national projects or programs.' "130 Finally, "other constitu-
tional provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of
federal funds."'' Yet, despite these articulated limitations, Congress's
spending power is vast.
32
Congress could enact legislation designed to improve public defense
services nationwide pursuant to its spending power. The legislation could
create a program under which states are eligible to receive federal grant
money if they comport with professionally established guidelines for the de-
livery of indigent defense services. For example, Congress could condition
receipt of federal funds on the state's compliance with the ABA's Ten Princi-
ples of a Public Defense Delivery System.'33 Given that such a program
would be designed to improve the quality and equity of criminal justice sys-
tems nationwide, it would satisfy the general welfare requirement. 14 Moreo-
ver, Congress could easily meet the requirement that it "'speak with a clear
126 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
127 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
121 Id. at 207 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
129 Id.; see also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 190 (2005) ("This
Court has repeatedly held that the obligations Congress imposes on States in spending power
legislation must be clear. Such legislation is 'in the nature of a contract' and funding recipients'
acceptance of the terms of that contract must be 'voluntar[y] and knowin[g]."' (citations
omitted)).
130 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978)).
131 Id. at 208.
132 See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism and the Administrative State, 82 TEx.
L. REV. 1197, 1209 (2004) (noting that "the Court has not struck down a statute as unconstitu-
tional under the spending power in the modern era." (citations omitted)).
133 See TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 4.
" The "general welfare" test is an elastic one. In fact, the Dole Court noted that "[tihe
level of deference to the congressional decision is such that the Court has more recently ques-
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voice"' regarding the conditions it may place on the states' receipt of fund-
ing. 35 Finally, there would be a clear nexus between the conditions on the
federal grants and the federal interest at stake.
Despite the fact that Congress conceivably could act pursuant to its
spending power, there are a number of reasons why this might not be the
best approach. First, in order for the federal legislation to have a meaningful
impact at the state level, Congress would have to spend a great deal of
money. 136 Second, there is the concern that federal money could have a
"crowding-out" effect on state spending.'37 Third, if Congress grants money
to the states on conditional terms, it must oversee the states' compliance with
those conditions, thereby creating a further drain on federal resources. Thus,
legislative action pursuant to Congress's spending power is not the best tool
with which to seek national, lasting public defense reform.
The case for congressional action under the Commerce Clause is
weaker still. The Constitution grants Congress the authority to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."' 38 "Modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence has 'identified
three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its com-
merce power.' " Congress can regulate the channels of interstate com-
merce, it can regulate the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce," and it can regulate those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce. 40 In recent years, the Court has
significantly narrowed its vision of appropriate legislation under the Com-
merce Clause, refusing to "pile inference upon inference in a manner that
would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States."' 141 Where
Congress has regulated economic activity under the Commerce Clause, the
Court has given legislators a wide berth. 142 Yet when Congress has attempted
to legislate in areas that have a purported "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce, the Court has required a well-developed empirical record of that
tioned whether 'general welfare' is a judicially enforceable restriction at all." Dole, 483 U.S. at
207 n.2 (citation omitted).
'3 See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 191 (2005).
'36 See infra note 210 and accompanying text. Also, funding for public defense tends to be
insufficient and fleeting. See, e.g., Bill Rankin, Without a Lawyer, Indigent's Case Stalls, AT-
LANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 6, 2009 (describing Georgia's repeated funding crises even in the wake
of a newly created state system).
117 JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 1, at 59 (explaining dynamic whereby newly created alter-
native sources of funding for public defense systems supplant rather than supplement general
support for indigent defense).
138 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
'19 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000) (quoting United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)).
'40 Id. at 609 (citations omitted).
41 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
142 See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32-33 (2005) (upholding a federal drug law even as
it applied to California residents whose medical marijuana use was lawful under state law
because the law addressed "quintessentially economic" activities).
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effect and a tight nexus between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce. 1
43
This recent line of cases suggests that congressional attempts to reform
public defense under the Commerce Clause would be ill-advised. To begin,
public defense services are not economic or commercial in nature, and given
the Supreme Court's emphasis in Gonzalez v. Raich upon economic activity
per se, that fact alone likely ends the discussion. 144 Theoretically, Congress
could point to a host of collateral consequences that flow from broken public
defense systems, and argue that, in the aggregate, these consequences do
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 14 But the Supreme Court's
most recent cases on Commerce Clause legislation indicate an exacting re-
view of legislation that looks for a tight, well-documented nexus between
the regulated activity and interstate commerce. 46 Public defense reform leg-
islation probably cannot meet that test.
Finally, even if Congress could legislate in the area of indigent defense
under its Article I powers, doing so would close at least one important door
to legislators. As argued in Part III, supra, the heart of a successful piece of
federal reform legislation must be the creation of a private cause of action in
federal court. In order for the statute to have as much of an effect as possi-
ble, lawmakers should include a provision that expressly abrogates the Elev-
enth Amendment, permitting the States to be named as defendants. Congress
cannot abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when it acts under its Article I
authority, but it can do so when it acts pursuant to its civil rights enforce-
ment authority. 47 As the Court explained in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, "the Fourteenth Amendment, by expanding federal power at the
expense of state autonomy ... fundamentally altered the balance of state and
federal power struck by the Constitution."'148 The fact that Congress cannot
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity when it acts under Article I is there-
143 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (holding that Congress exceeded the scope of its Commerce
Clause authority in passing a statute that made it a federal crime to knowingly possess a gun in
a school zone because the statute at issue was "a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing
to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define
those terms" and that it was "not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity,
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regu-
lated"); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 (holding that Congress lacked the authority to
pass the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act under the Commerce
Clause because the provision did not regulate an activity that had a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce).
' "See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
'41 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
' Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (ruling that gender motivated violence was not connected
closely enough with interstate commerce to permit Congress to regulate it via the Commerce
Clause).
'47 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64-66 (1996) (explaining why abroga-
tion may be permissible when Congress acts pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment but not
permissible under Article I).
'48 Id. at 59.
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fore a final reason why action pursuant to the Commerce or Spending
Clauses would not be a viable path for federal lawmakers.
Congress may, however, enact the NRTCA pursuant to its civil rights
enforcement authority-that is, under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Section Five provides that Congress shall have the power to
"enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions" of the Amendment it-
self.149 In early cases addressing the scope of congressional authority under
the Enforcement Clause, the Supreme Court "recognized the importance of
allowing congressional flexibility when enforcing the post-Civil War
Amendments."' 50 Further, the Court recognized that it needed "to give Con-
gress the means to enforce the objectives of the Amendments with effective
legislation and to prevent the Amendments from becoming vehicles for mere
declaratory judgments that the states could subsequently ignore."''
Applying this flexible standard of review, the Supreme Court upheld a
panoply of federal legislation passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment' s Enforcement Clause. In Ex parte Virginia, the Court upheld a federal
law that criminalized racial discrimination by state judges in the jury selec-
tion process.'52 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court found the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 constitutional, even though the statute provided for sub-
stantial federal involvement in state-run election protocols.' 3 Similarly, in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court upheld section 4(e) of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, even though it directly contradicted New York's English-liter-
acy voting requirement. 54 In each of these cases, the Supreme Court af-
firmed congressional action to reform invidious discrimination, even when
such action targeted facially neutral state laws, and even where it inserted
the federal government into historically state functions, such as criminal jus-
tice and voting procedures.
Recent Supreme Court case law evaluating the scope of congressional
authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment reveals a much
narrower vision for congressional authority under the Enforcement Clause.
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court announced a critical distinc-
tion between what it deemed permissible "remedial" legislation and imper-
missible "substantive" legislation.'55 Under Section Five, Congress is free to
enact legislation that "deters or remedies constitutional violations ... even if
in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and
intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the
149 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
"So Rachel Toker, Tying the Hands of Congress: City of Boeme v. Flores, 33 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rav. 273, 277 (1998).
"I' Id. at 278.
112 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
153 383 U.S. 301, 315-16 (1966) (describing provisions such as the suspension of literacy
tests and other voter qualifications, suspension of all new voting regulations pending review,
and the assignment of federal examiners to list qualified voters).
1- 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
155 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997).
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States." 156 Congress may not, however, implement a "substantive change in
the governing law.' 5 7 Legitimate remedial legislation addresses discrimina-
tion that is "flagrant"15 8; it targets "the widespread and persisting depriva-
tion of constitutional rights"1 9 and it "exhibit[s] 'congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end."' 160
Applying this more stringent test, the Supreme Court struck down a
number of congressional attempts to target discrimination under its enforce-
ment authority. For example, the Court found unconstitutional Congress's
Patent Remedy Act, holding that the statute failed for lack of congruence
under Boerne because Congress failed to demonstrate a pattern of state pat-
ent infringement.' 61 Recently, the Court struck down the civil remedy provi-
sion of the Violence Against Women Act, holding that the provision failed to
address state actors and was not a congruent and proportional response to
gender-based discrimination in the prosecution of state crimes. 62 On similar
grounds, the Court struck down the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").1
63
Accordingly, when Congress passes legislation under its civil rights enforce-
ment authority, it must do so cautiously. Not only must it be careful to rem-
edy the violation of a known, documented constitutional violation, but it also
must narrowly tailor its statutory remedy to fit the targeted injury or threat.
Despite the suggestion that Boerne marked the demise of congressional
authority under Section Five, 164 Congress has been able to legislate under
this "positive grant of legislative power"'165 and withstand judicial scrutiny
post-Boerne. In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld a provision of the Family
and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") that permitted state employees to re-
cover money damages in federal court where the state failed to comply with
the "family-care provision" of the FMLA. 166 According to the Court, Con-
gress had complied with the Boerne mandate in creating a federal cause of
action for state employees because the remedy was congruent and propor-
1
5 6 Id. at 518.
157 Id. at 519.
158 Id. at 525.
1
5 9 Id. at 526.
160 Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (quoting Boerne, 521
U.S. at 520).
61 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999).
162 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-27 (2000).
163 Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (finding Title I of
ADA unconstitutional because Congress did not demonstrate a record of irrational employment
discrimination against disabled persons by states); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000) (holding that ADEA failed congruence and proportionality test of Boerne).
164 See, e.g., Charles E. Schumer, Under Attack: Congressional Power in the Twenty-First
Century, 1 HARV. L. & PoI'Y REV. 3, 31-33 (2007) (describing a "conservative judicial ac-
tivist attack on congressional legislative authority" under Section Five).
165 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 555.
16 Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735.
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tional to the targeted harm. 67 Specifically, the legislative record indicated
that "stereotype-based beliefs about the allocation of family duties remained
firmly rooted, and employers' reliance on them in establishing discrimina-
tory leave policies remained widespread."'
168
Most recently, the Supreme Court upheld an action pursuant to Title II
of the ADA. 69 Two disabled persons brought suit under Title II arguing that
they had been denied access to the courts because of Tennessee's failure to
make reasonable accommodations for them as required by the ADA. 70 The
Court held that, in enacting Title II, Congress did not exceed its power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 ' First, "[i]n the deliberations
that led up to the enactment of the ADA, Congress identified important
shortcomings in existing laws that rendered them 'inadequate to address the
pervasive problems of discrimination that people with disabilities are fac-
ing."' 72 Second, because Title II required "only 'reasonable modifications'
that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided, and
only when the individual seeking modification is otherwise eligible for the
service," Congress had responded appropriately to the identified pattern of
discrimination.'73 Thus, Title II of the ADA was found to be a congruent and
proportional response to the nationwide problem of discrimination against
persons with disabilities.
These recent cases suggest that, while Section Five congressional au-
thority may not be as strong as it was under Ex parte Virginia,174 it remains a
viable source of legislative authority given the right circumstances, such as
the nationwide crisis in indigent defense services. Public defense legislation,
like the proposed NRTCA, addresses a well-articulated fundamental right
that states are violating on a systematic basis.'75 Since 1963, when the Su-
preme Court rendered its decision in Gideon thereby requiring appointed
counsel for defendants who could not afford representation, the states have
known that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is applicable to them.
76
Moreover, only a few years later, the Supreme Court confirmed that there is
"no doubt of 'the power of Congress to enforce by appropriate criminal
sanction every right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 17 Subsequent cases have reaffirmed the principle that a state
cannot hale a person into court without providing them the tools for an ade-
167 Id. at 727-35 (citing Boerne and applying its approach).
168 Id. at 730.
169 See Lane, 541 U.S. 509.
'
7 0 Id. at 513.
171 Id. at 531-34.
72 Id. at 526 (citation omitted).
1
73 Id. at 511.
'74 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
171 See supra Part H.A.
176 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
177 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 789 (1966) (quoting United States v. Williams,
341 U.S. 70, 72 (1951)).
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quate defense. 78 And yet, nearly four decades later, the states (with rare
exception) 179 have failed to heed this instruction.18 0
Second, Congress has ample data to justify the legislation under the
Boerne test. Lawmakers could hear testimony-as they are currently
18 1 -
from policymakers who have been tracking the states' progress on this front
for decades. The ABA, the National Legal Aid & Defender Association, the
National Right to Counsel Committee, and local public defender offices, for
example, could offer oral testimony regarding the inadequate public defense
systems across the country. Moreover, legislators would have access to de-
cades of written reports documenting the plight of poor defendants. 8 In
short, there would be no dearth of evidence to support the claim that the
states have neglected to secure the right to counsel as the Sixth Amendment
requires.'83
Third, the NRTCA proposed in Part II.A, supra, is a congruent and
proportional response to the states' ongoing Sixth Amendment violations.
The heart of the NRTCA is the creation of a cause of action that permits
individuals to vindicate their right to counsel in federal court. This measure
is appropriate given the documented decades of violations of the right to
counsel114 Moreover, the proposed legislation does not entail the same types
' See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1985) (listing the decisions where the
Court has taken steps to ensure "meaningful access to justice"); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires the states to provide indi-
gent defense counsel for direct appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses require states to provide transcripts to indigent
defendants for appellate process).
"' For example, in California, public defense services are provided on a county basis, and
some counties fare much better than others. See Lauren McSherry, County Caseload Piling
Up, INLAND VALLEY DAILY BULL., Apr. 20, 2008 (citing disparity in caseloads, rates of trial,
and numbers of available judges across counties). Still, as a whole, the nation's public defense
systems suffer from resource disparity compared to prosecutor functions, as well as inadequate
access to technology and investigative services. See GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 1,
at 13-14.
I8o See supra Part II.A.
.sI See Members Testify, supra note 36.
182 See, e.g., GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 1 (documenting the longstanding
nature of the defense crisis).
' In fact, the historical record regarding state constitutional violations in the public de-
fense realm provides an even stronger basis for congressional action than in other cases where
the Supreme Court has upheld congressional action. For example, in Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs, where a majority of the Court upheld a provision of the FMLA
that allowed state employees to recover money damages in federal court, the evidence of gen-
der discrimination before Congress concerned private sector employment and leave practices,
rather than the practices of the states themselves. 538 U.S. 721, 746-47 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). As Justice Kennedy urged in his dissent, the question was not whether a pattern of
gender-based discrimination existed in society at large, which Congress should attempt to rem-
edy with legislation, but rather whether there exists a pattern "of unconstitutional discrimina-
tion by States in the grant of family leave." Id. at 749 (emphasis added). In contrast, if
Congress were to conduct hearings in order to enact legislation such as the NRTCA, it would
have at its disposal ample evidence demonstrating that the states have themselves failed to
secure the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for indigent defendants.
"8 For example, in New York, where litigation challenging the county-based public de-
fense system is pending, lawmakers had been on notice that the system was broken for decades
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of elaborate federal measures that were upheld in the Voting Rights Cases,
for example, federal examiners involved in state voting practices. 185 In con-
trast, this proposed legislation demonstrates congressional restraint. The pro-
posed statute does not, for example, define indigency, nor does it articulate
the precise manner in which states must provide public defense. Notwith-
standing the fact that many experts in the public defense field agree that a
statewide, state-funded oversight commission is the optimal method for the
delivery of defense services, s6 the statute leaves the states free to experiment
and determine what system best meets the demands of the Sixth Amend-
ment. By granting the states flexibility in this manner, Congress can craft a
proportional remedy to rampant Sixth Amendment violations, while at the
same time reflecting the "etiquette of federalism."' 87
In sum, recent civil rights enforcement cases reveal the Court's willing-
ness to defer to congressional remedies that seek to protect suspect classes
and/or fundamental rights, and the NRTCA falls within the latter category.
Thus, the NRTCA could be enacted on firm constitutional footing.
2. Congressional Incentives to Enact the NRTCA
Some critics may also wonder why Congress would even attempt to
pass this piece of legislation. If, as argued in Part II of this Article, there are
no votes to be gained in reforming public defense at the state legislative
level, why would federal lawmakers be any more inclined to take up this
issue? At first blush, this criticism seems well-founded. Certainly, no mem-
ber of Congress will win reelection because of her tremendous support
among the indigent defendant population. However, there are several rea-
sons to think that Congress may, in fact, pursue legislation like the
NRTCA. 18s
First, federal legislators have a duty to remedy the national deprivation
of a fundamental right. Members of Congress take an oath to uphold the
United States Constitution, 89 and, if the states choose to disregard ongoing
violations of a fundamental right, the federal government has not only the
prior to the lawsuit's initiation. Hurrell-Harring Complaint, supra note 25, at 2. Michigan's
defense crisis had also been well-documented for years prior to the filing of the class action
suit pending in that state. Duncan Complaint, supra note 26, at 23-25.
185 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315-16 (1966).
1
8 6 See THE SPANGENBERO GROUP, STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS (2006)
(describing the different funding systems in the various states and endorsing full state funding,
with few exceptions); see also GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note I at 21-22 (citing the
need for statewide oversight of defense services).
187 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 964 (1997) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 583 (1995)).
188 As a preliminary matter, it is also worth noting that, regardless of whether Congress
views this particular proposal as politically viable, it is the role of the academy to explore the
contours of permissible legislative solutions, even if that means pushing the envelope in the
process.
18' U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 3.
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authority, but also the responsibility, to enact legislation that creates the in-
centive for reform. 19°
Second, there may be good incentives for members of Congress to take
up this cause. Under-funded and inadequate public defense systems may re-
sult in conviction and sentencing errors, and all taxpayers have an interest in
criminal adjudications that are timely, efficient, and accurate. One study in
Michigan demonstrated that ill-equipped and over-burdened defense counsel
lead to expensive sentencing errors.' 9 ' Specifically, the study showed that
Michigan prisoners serve, on average, 127% of their minimum terms.
92
Over a five-year period, these elongated sentences can cost the state up to
seventy million dollars. 193 Given their geographic breadth and diversity,
94
members of Congress may see a national picture of the public defense crisis
and be inclined to act. Thus, members of Congress may appropriately frame
this issue as one of prudent economics and not just the constitutional rights
of criminal defendants.
Finally, it is worth noting that, historically, there have been instances
where Congress has acted out of moral imperative rather than political expe-
diency. For example, when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
there was entrenched racial animus in many parts of the country,195 and when
Congress enacted reforms to enhance the rights of mentally ill persons, it
sought to protect a historically voiceless group. 96 The fact that members of
Congress heard testimony in 2009 regarding the state of public defense na-
tionwide indicates that at least some federal legislators are aware of the
depth of this issue and are amenable to reform proposals. 9
3. The Statute Under Judicial Scrutiny
Even if Congress has the authority and the political will to pass legisla-
tion like the NRTCA, it remains an open question whether the current Su-
190 Reimer, supra note 42, at 2 ("The right to counsel is a federal right that must be
secured by federal action. In the five decades since Gideon, the federal government has largely
remained on the sidelines as the states have struggled, with varying degrees of commitment, to
guarantee this fundamental constitutional right. As report after report documents the enormous
costs of this neglect, the government can no longer afford inaction.").
' ' See Carol Lundberg, Sentencing Errors Cost the State Millions, LAW. WKLY., May 11,
2009, available at http://www.sado.org/sado-news/sentencing__errors-mlw 5_11_09.htm.
192 Id.
193 Id.
'9 Devins, supra note 43, at 1179.
9 United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (citing as goals of
Title VII "to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy" and to "open em-
ployment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to
them" (citation omitted)); see also 110 CONG. REc. 6556 (1964) ("Every American is aware
that discrimination in public accommodations is what has motivated most of the 2,100 demon-
strations which occurred in the last half of 1963.").
196 See, e.g., Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 10801-51 (2006).
"97 See Members Testify, supra note 36.
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preme Court would uphold this legislation if challenged as unconstitutional.
It is inevitable that, if this legislation were to pass, states would challenge
the act as unconstitutional on one of several federalism grounds. 9 Given the
current Supreme Court's conservative majority, 199 why should one think that
the NRTCA would survive constitutional scrutiny?
First, this statute is eminently defensible under the Supreme Court's
civil rights enforcement precedent, as discussed in Part III.A., supra. Moreo-
ver, the doctrine of stare decisis requires the Court to defer to its own prece-
dent absent extraordinary circumstances.2°0 Thus, one may be optimistic that
this Court would view the NRTCA as consistent with its prior civil rights
enforcement precedent.
Second, even if the Court were to adopt a more restrictive view of per-
missible Section Five legislation, the NRTCA would still pass muster. One
can glean from the dissents in cases where the Supreme Court upheld con-
gressional action under Section Five, a sense of what a more conservative
articulation of congressional authority under Section Five would look like.
For example, in his dissent in Tennessee v. Lane, Justice Scalia explained
that he would replace the "flabby" "congruence and proportionality" test
from Boerne with a narrower test for whether congressional action under
Section Five is legitimate. 0' Justice Scalia argued:
Section 5 grants Congress the power "to enforce, by appropriate
legislation," the other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
• . . one does not, within any normal meaning of the term, "en-
force" a prohibition by issuing a still broader prohibition directed
to the same end. One does not, for example, "enforce" a 55-mile-
per-hour speed limit by imposing a 45-mile-per-hour speed limit-
even though that is indeed directed to the same end of automotive
safety and will undoubtedly result in many fewer violations of the
55-mile-per-hour limit.2o2
Unlike the speed limit analogy that Justice Scalia employs, the NRTCA is
not a statute that seeks to vindicate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by
increasing what is required of the states. Instead, the NRTCA tracks the lan-
guage that the Supreme Court itself has used in defining the right to counsel
(e.g., in defining a violation as the absence of counsel, both constructive and
actual, after the initiation of adversarial proceedings).0 3 Further, the statute
198 See supra notes 96-99, 112-119 and accompanying text.
99Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2007, at Al.
200 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("Indeed, the very concept of
the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a
respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.").
201 541 U.S. 509, 557-58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202 Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
203 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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allows the states independently to determine precisely how to meet the re-
quirements of the Sixth Amendment. Thus, legislators should be optimistic
about the results of a constitutional challenge to the NRTCA before the cur-
rent Court, even if the Court were to adopt a more restrictive view of con-
gressional authority under Section Five.
B. Alternative Reform Measures
Given that there is a finite amount of political capital to be spent on
public defense reform, one may wonder whether the NRTCA represents the
optimal reform effort. Scholars have recognized that the Sixth Amendment
crisis is national in scope, and they have offered myriad solutions. 04 One
prevalent suggestion for national reform is the creation of a national defense
center that would serve as a repository of best-practice data, offer condi-
tional funds to states, and provide expertise regarding defense services. For
example, Professors Hoffman and King have argued for the abolition of fed-
eral habeas review of state criminal judgments, except in a small set of
cases, so that federal habeas funding could instead be channeled to the states
where trial counsel services are desperately lacking.205 Under their plan,
which builds on a concept originally put forth by the ABA in 1979,0 the
federal government would create an independent, not-for-profit "Center for
Defense Services. '20 7 The Constitution Project's 2009 Report, Justice De-
nied, also promotes the idea of a "National Center for Defense Services to
assist and strengthen the ability of state governments to provide quality legal
representation. 20 8 Similarly, Professor Lefstein has urged the federal gov-
ernment to look to the public defense system in England and model national
reforms on that system. 09 While this author is not conceptually opposed to
the creation of a national Center for Defense Services, she nevertheless
thinks that this suggestion suffers from a critical infirmity: it costs a great
deal of money.210 In the current economic climate, any federal action that
204 See supra notes 1, 7 and accompanying text.
205 See Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Crimi-
nal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 791 (2009).2°6 AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION (1979), available at: http://
www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/121 .pdf.
207 Hoffman & King, supra note 205 at 828-29.
208 JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 1, at 200; see also Backus & Marcus, supra note 1, at
1127.
209 Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from England and the Need
for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGs L.J. 835 (2004).
210 To understand why the federal government would have to spend vast sums of money in
order to make a meaningful difference at the state level, one need only look at what states are
spending and what states actually need. For example, Georgia has allocated $40.4 million for
its statewide indigent defense services in 2009, and in the past annual allocations have been
insufficient. JusIcE DENIED, supra note 1, at 57-58. Similarly, one study estimates that Ten-
nessee spent $56.4 million on public defense, and still this is less than half what was spent by
the state's prosecutorial arm. Id. at 61. Even if the federal government made a modest grant to
each of the fifty states on the condition that states comport with public defense guidelines, this
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requires an annual allocation of federal dollars will meet extraordinary
resistance.
Professor Gershowitz has urged that the Supreme Court set a minimum
definition of indigency for Sixth Amendment purposes.2" ' Indeed, there are
disparate and insufficient notions of what qualifies as "indigent" at the state
level. However, even if the Court were to grant certiorari in a case that
presented this question, the states would still need to grapple with how to
provide effective assistance of counsel to a potentially expanded pool of
indigent defendants.
Professor Brensike Primus has suggested several novel structural re-
forms that would address the national public defense crisis. Under one of her
reform proposals, appellate attorneys would be able to raise ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims on appeal, rather than requiring defendants to raise
such claims in a collateral, post-conviction proceeding.2"2 While this mea-
sure would indeed make better use of appellate counsel in state systems, it
does not create an incentive for lawmakers to improve a state's defense func-
tion through greater funding, training, and oversight for trial counsel. In an-
other piece, Professor Brensike Primus also argued for congressional reform
of the federal habeas statute, under which federal habeas relief would be
available only when a state routinely violates criminal defendants' rights as
part of a systemic practice. 213 While this proposal offers great efficiency
gains and may be politically more attractive than the NRTCA,2 14 it generates
these gains at the expense of an individual habeas cause of action in federal
court. Not only may it be unconstitutional to eliminate individualized habeas
review, as she acknowledges, 215 but more important, the reform leaves the
individual defendant who happens to be in a jurisdiction without systemic
errors with no viable federal check on his state court conviction. 216
would be a large, and ever-growing, annual expense for the federal government. For example,
if each state received a $500,000 grant-only one percent of a $50 million budget-the federal
government would spend $25 million a year. Further, it is not even clear that a one percent
budget increase would be adequate to effect meaningful change across the nation.
2 Adam Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571 (2005).
212 Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 679 (2007).
213 Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CAL. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1351495.
214 It may be more politically attractive because, while Professor Brensike Primus intends
for her reform measure to improve the general state of affairs for criminal defendants, her
legislative reform further restricts the ability of prisoners to bring cases in federal court. Id. A
statute perceived as a further restriction on the rights of criminal defendants certainly may be
more palatable to politicians than the NRTCA set forth herein.21
5 d. at 172-74.
216 Professor Brensike Primus argues that the criminal defendant theoretically could peti-
tion the U.S. Supreme Court for review upon completion of direct review or during state court
post-conviction proceedings, or he could seek an original writ of habeas corpus. Id. Yet it
would be the rare defendant who succeeded in petitioning the Supreme Court in any of these
postures. In 2009, when the Court granted an original writ for a death row inmate in Georgia, it
was the Court's first grant of an original writ in almost fifty years. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 2
(2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 47
The National Right to Counsel Act
Another reform measure is illustrated by the recently passed Innocence
Protection Act, a part of the Justice for All Act of 2004.217 The bill
provides access to post-conviction DNA testing in Federal cases,
helps States improve the quality of legal representation in capital
cases . .. increases compensation in Federal cases of wrongful
conviction [and] . . .establishes the Kirk Bloodsworth Post-Con-
viction DNA Testing Program, which authorizes $25 million over
five years to defray the costs of post-conviction DNA testing.
218
While these are laudable goals, the legislation fails to target those cases that
constitute the majority of public defense cases. The majority of public de-
fenders are not handling capital cases,219 and the majority of criminal cases
are not ones where DNA evidence is the central issue. 220 Thus, there is still a
dire need for the states to improve public defense services in the majority of
non-capital cases.
The legislation proposed herein is not mutually exclusive of these other
reform measures, but it does attempt to do something new. Because the pro-
posed statute allows defendants to vindicate their Sixth Amendment rights in
federal court, it provides a long-term incentive for states to reform and main-
tain their reform, which many states have struggled to do. Moreover, this
proposed legislation has another element that distinguishes it from many
other proposals: because it creates a cause of action, and therefore achieves
its end through an incentive mechanism, it does not require recurring appro-
priations from Congress. Finally, unlike proposals that create a national
center for defense services and set guidelines for the states' delivery of de-
fense services, under the regime proposed, states are free to serve as "labo-
ratories of democracy" 221 to find whichever system best meets the
Constitution's demands.
217 18 U.S.C. § 3600A (2006).
218 150 CONG. REc. S 11,609 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2004) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy
(D-Vt.)).
219 For example, one study regarding Colorado's administration of the death penalty re-
vealed that, on a statewide basis, only 2.8% of homicide cases were capital cases. Stephanie
Hindson et al., Race, Gender, Region and Death Sentencing in Colorado, 1980-1999, 77 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 549, 575-76 (2006). This, of course, does not take into account non-homicide
felonies and misdemeanors for which defendants receive representation.
220 Lauren C. Boucher, Advancing the Argument in Favor of State Compensation for the
Erroneously Convicted and Wrongfully Incarcerated, 56 CATH. U. L. REv. 1069, 1075 (2007)
(noting that "in the first 130 DNA exonerations in the United States, mistaken identification
was a factor in 101 of the original wrongful convictions" (citations omitted)). Thus mistaken
identification, and not DNA evidence, is a much more common issue, and can only be attacked
through zealous representation.
221 New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory.").
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that there is a need for a national, legislative solu-
tion to the indigent defense crisis and that Congress can and should pass
such legislation. A recent Nevada news story reinforces the need for the type
of reform advanced in this Article. A report in Washoe County, Nevada,
found that the public defender's office required thirty more public defenders
in order to handle its caseload of more than ten thousand clients per year.
22
In response to the report, and ACLU allegations of related constitutional
violations, Washoe County District Attorney Dick Gammick maintained that
there was nothing wrong with the current system, notwithstanding defenders'
excessive caseloads. 23 In defense of his position, Gammick was quoted as
asking: "Where are the federal lawsuits that people aren't being properly
represented .... Where are the actions being taken against defense attorneys
by either the state bar or the state supreme court because they are not ade-
quately representing defendants?" 224 The notion that all is fine if there are
not federal lawsuits raising systemic deprivations of the right to counsel is
probably not unique to Washoe County, Nevada. For the reasons described
in Part II of this Article, to date, such lawsuits have not been consistently
successful in state court, and they have been almost entirely unsuccessful in
federal court. Consequently, parties are discouraged from even bringing
these suits. As a result, miscarriages of justice like the ones described in Part
II of this Article persist across the country. This legislation proposes to end
the chronic deprivation of the fundamental right to effective counsel by al-
lowing federal courts (1) to hear pre-trial Sixth Amendment cases and (2) to
grant the necessary equitable relief. Until the federal courts are open to these
suits, naysayers like District Attorney Gammick will continue to perpetuate
the myth that Gideon is alive and well.
222 Report: More Public Defenders Are Needed in Washoe County (KTVN Reno Channel
2 News television broadcast July 9, 2009), available at http://www.ktvn.com/Global/
story.asp?S= 10673027&nav=menu549_2.
223 Id.
224Id,
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